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MORAL VIRTUE AND INCLUSIVE HAPPINESS: FROM ANCIENT TO
RECENT IN WESTERN AND CONFUCIAN TRADITIONS
SHIRONG LUO
ABSTRACT: What is the relationship between moral virtue and happiness? Does having
moral virtues make their possessors happy? Can one be happy without them? Philosophers
provide diverging answers to these questions due to their different understandings of the
concept of happiness which has multifarious meanings and senses. In this essay, I compare the
representative Western theories of happiness with what may be called “a classical Confucian
view” informed by recent scholarship on classical Confucianism. I argue that for classical
Confucian philosophers, especially Confucius and Mencius, there are two kinds of happiness:
exclusive (or unshared) and inclusive (or shared) happiness. I conclude that moral virtue is
necessary for inclusive happiness shared by the virtuous and the recipients of their virtuous
actions and/or policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the topic of how moral virtue is related to happiness is not new, recent years
have seen a considerable resurgence of scholarly interest in the relationship between
the two (Annas 1993; Bloomfield 2017).1 It seems that the debate has been mainly
________________________
LUO, Shirong: Associate Professor of Philosophy, Simmons University, USA. Email:
luo8@simmons.edu
1 Julia Annas observes that for most people happiness means wealth and pleasure but they also claim
that they want to earn them. She concludes that happiness is something earned (2004, 44-51). The point
here is that happiness is not just about having what one wants but also about how one obtains it. This
conception of happiness is close to the classical Confucian idea of happiness discussed in this paper, but
not quite the same because for classical Confucians, the ethical is overriding; the virtuous may choose
not to earn happiness under certain circumstances. Paul Bloomfield makes the case that since virtue is
necessary for self-respect, which is necessary for happiness, virtue is necessary for happiness (2017,
2613-2628). His argument also seems compatible with the Confucian perspective because there are
certain things the virtuous would not do, otherwise they would not be able to live with themselves.
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focused on the following issues: What is the relationship between moral virtue and
happiness? Does having moral virtues make their possessors happy? Can one be happy
without them? There is also a broader question of why one should be moral. This
question, in the context of virtue ethics, may be suitably modified into the question of
why one should be virtuous. 2 This paper examines how contemporary Confucian
scholars answer the above questions and evaluates how well their conclusions are
supported by two of the most important classical Confucian texts—the Analects and
the Mencius. They seem to agree that for classical Confucian philosophers such as
Confucius (551-479 BCE) and Mencius (372-289 BCE), the notions of happiness and
the good life are hybrid or integrative concepts with both descriptive and prescriptive
dimensions, and as such, moral virtue is necessary for happiness and the good life
(Back 2018; Huang 2008; Ivanhoe 2013; Olberding 2013; Shun 2014).
What makes a character trait (consistent attitude, affect, choice, and action) a moral
virtue is the role it plays in achieving happiness which is, as the Greek philosopher
Aristotle puts it, the ultimate goal of human life. If so, the relationship between
happiness and moral virtue may be framed in terms of ends and means. Aristotle claims
that every human action seeks some good and the highest good achievable in action is
happiness.3 Thus, moral virtue is a means to happiness. However, by “happiness”,
Aristotle means individual happiness, that is, the happiness of the individual who
possesses virtue. While the classical Confucian philosophers Confucius and Mencius
would agree with Aristotle that moral virtue is a means to happiness, what they meant
by “happiness” was shared or inclusive happiness (tong-le 同樂), i.e., the happiness of
both the virtuous and the recipients of their virtuous actions (Mencius 1B1). For
classical Confucian thinkers, enjoyment in the company of others is superior to
enjoyment by oneself (ibid.), which the English saying “the more the merrier”
corroborates. When asked about why one should engage in self-cultivation (of moral
virtue), Confucius replied that it was for the sake of winning respect and making the
people happy (Analects 14. 42). For classical Confucian philosophers, respect is a
natural response to virtue.3 Being respected can make one happy. As we can see, the
classical Confucian notion of happiness is inclusive happiness.
2. WESTERN THEORIES OF HAPPINESS
Since antiquity philosophers as well as ordinary people have disagreed about the nature
of happiness. As a result, the term “happiness” has multifarious meanings and senses.
Consequently, philosophical opinions diverge on how moral virtue is related to
happiness and the good life. In order to answer the question of how moral virtue is
2

Yong Huang (2008) argues that since “one's true self-interest is to seek joy in things uniquely human,
which is to be moral, self-interest and morality become identical” (321). It seems clear that not just any
joy seeking coincides with morality. Only when one’s perspective transcends one’s self-interest and
group interests and rises to the height of the humanity, can it become the moral point of view.
3
According to Aristotle, happiness is the best, complete, and self-sufficient good achievable in action
(1999, 8).
3
The Confucian philosopher Xun Zi says that not respecting a virtuous person betrays a beastly attitude
(Xun Zi, 138).
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related to happiness, we need to be clear about what the term “happiness” means. As
mentioned earlier, the term “happiness” is multiply ambiguous, or as Haybron puts it,
it is “a paradigm of unclarity, the Mother of All Swamps” (Haybron 2008, vii). Thus,
there is a need for disambiguation. One way to do this is to separate two senses of
happiness: a descriptive sense and a prescriptive sense (Haybron 2005: 289). 4 The
former pertains to a particular mental state, i.e., pleasure, whereas the latter refers to a
person’s wellbeing. According to Haybron's taxonomy, wellbeing is a broader concept
than happiness in that it includes health, success, friendship, and certain psychological
states such as happiness (Haybron 2008, 38). It follows that while wellbeing is a
normative concept, it has a descriptive dimension, namely happiness. Thus, the
distinction between the two senses is not a clear-cut one. On the other hand, moral
virtue is necessary for the good life, but it seems irrelevant to wellbeing or happiness
(38).
In addition to the two senses of happiness, there are three theories of happiness to
be distinguished from one another. According to Derek Parfit’s tripartite taxonomy
(Parfit 1984, 493), the three types of theories of happiness are hedonistic theories,
desire satisfaction theories, and objective list theories. For the sake of simplicity, I shall
treat them as if there were only one theory in each category. I therefore refer to
hedonistic theories simply as “hedonism”, desire satisfaction theories as “desire
satisfaction theory”, and objective list theories as “objective list theory”. While each
theory has different versions—some of which are more sophisticated and defensible
than the basic version, I prefer the basic version to the more complex ones to avoid
getting bogged down by complications in a preliminary comparative study like the one
I am undertaking.
Broadly speaking, theories of happiness may be classified into two categories:
monism and pluralism. Hedonism and desire satisfaction theory are two monistic
theories, whereas objective list theory exemplifies pluralism. The classical form of
hedonism identifies happiness with pleasure experienced by the individual in question.
According to hedonism, the more pleasure one experiences, the happier one gets. If
there is little pleasure in a person’s life or there is much pain, that person cannot be
happy. While hedonism is intuitively appealing, it has been called a “doctrine worthy
only of swine” (Mill 1998, 55). Such notoriety seems to rest on a narrow understanding
of the term “pleasure”, that is, pleasure from eating, drinking, or sex. But gastronomic
and sexual pleasures are just a tiny part of the vast array of pleasures human beings are
capable of experiencing. John Stuart Mill tried to make hedonism defensible by
proposing the idea of higher pleasure (Mill 1998, 56-57). The contemporary
philosopher Fred Feldman takes a similar approach to hedonism by introducing the idea
of attitudinal pleasure (Feldman 2004). Clearly neither of them defends the classical or
4

According to Haybron's taxonomy, wellbeing, morality/virtue, and other values are subsumed under
the notion of good life; psychological states and other goods are subsumed under the concept of
wellbeing; happiness and other mental states are subsumed under the category of psychological states
(Haybron, 38). It follows that happiness is included in wellbeing. Therefore, the descriptive concept of
happiness is hidden in the normative concept of wellbeing. If so, it is hard to make a clear distinction
between wellbeing and happiness.
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simple version of hedonism. What they have done is to incorporate a cognitive
component in the concept of pleasure to make it more respectable.
In its simple form, desire satisfaction theory identifies happiness with getting what
one wants (Heathwood 2006, 540). Since the content of desire is not constrained, the
door is left wide open for all kinds of desires. This conceptual openness makes the
theory broadly applicable, but also vulnerable to objections. Two kinds of desires
undermine the basic form of desire satisfaction theory: ill-informed desires and evil
desires. The objection that the satisfaction of an ill-informed desire may result in a
reduction of one’s wellbeing has led to a revision of the theory according to which
someone’s life goes well to the extent that her well-informed desires get satisfied. The
problem posed by evil desires for the theory is obvious—it goes against our deeply held
moral convictions. For example, it is implausible to say a torturer whose many sadistic
desires get satisfied has lived a good life or enjoyed a high level of wellbeing.
As a pluralistic theory, objective list theory states that the good life is constituted
by a variety of goods such as knowledge, pleasure, friendship, achievement, virtue, and
so on. Many such theories do include an ethical dimension. For instance, some (moral)
virtues are included in W.D. Ross’s seven prima facie duties (Ross 1930, 140). Thomas
Hurka seems to hold a similar view (2011). As we shall see, what makes the classical
Confucian view different is that the ethical dimension defines the good life and plays
the fundamental role in the life of the virtuous individual (Analects 12.1, 15.24). This
salient feature is what Kwong-loi Shun refers to as “the primacy of the ethical” (Shun
2014, 131).
3. THE CLASSICAL CONFUCIAN VIEW
The three theories of happiness each focus on one or more aspects of happiness. As
such, they are not necessarily incompatible: hedonism focuses on pleasure, desire
satisfaction theory concentrates on desire fulfillment, and objective list theory
accentuates major sources of happiness. Happiness can be all those things defined or
listed by the three theories, but of a complete theory, they all fall short. A complete
theory should provide guidance at least in principle on how to obtain pleasure, satisfy
desires, or secure the major sources of happiness. In this regard, classical Confucian
philosophers such as Confucius and Mencius do have something important to offer.
Their contributions to the discussion concentrate on two aspects of the relationship
between moral virtue and happiness: one concerns the nature of happiness; the other
concerns the ways in which happiness is obtained.
According to Philip Ivanhoe, happiness (le 樂) in classical Confucian literature
refers to “a special feeling that comes to those who follow the Way; it is an ethical
response to certain features of the world and primarily about how one is living one’s
life” (Ivanhoe 2013, 266). Notice that this conception fits neither of the two senses of
happiness found in Western philosophical and psychological literature—the descriptive
sense of happiness as a feeling of pleasure or the prescriptive sense of happiness as
wellbeing. It seems that for classical Confucian thinkers, the idea of happiness is a
hybrid or an integration of the two senses. On the one hand, it pertains to a feeling (of
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joy) while on the other hand, it is an ethical response to how one is living one’s life.
Thus, the Confucian notion of happiness is inclusive of two dimensions—a
psychological dimension and an ethical dimension. The ethical dimension has two
features. First, it is teleological in the sense that moral virtues are cultivated toward an
ethical telos. When asked why one should engage in moral self-cultivation (xiu-ji 修
己), Confucius replied that the objective of moral self-cultivation was to win respect
and to bring happiness to the multitude (Analects 14.42). To accomplish such a feat, it
would be necessary that the virtuous participate in the government. One could not bring
happiness to the multitude in one’s capacity as a private individual.5 In the historical
contexts in which classical Confucians found themselves, they could bring about the
universal happiness for the multitude only if they took office. However, for the
virtuous, to take office or not to take office would depend on how the state was
governed (Analects, 8.13). This proviso leads to the second feature of the ethical
dimension, that is, moral virtue is about making the right choices. In this connection,
Confucius posed a rhetorical question—“If one did not (consistently) choose the allinclusive virtue (ren 仁), how could one be considered wise?” (Analects 4.1) Mencius
quoted Confucius as saying that there were only two ways to follow—the Way of virtue
(ren 仁) or its opposite (Mencius, 4A2). The virtuous, as Ivanhoe points out, are those
who follow the Way (of virtue) of their own volition (266). Following the Way is not
easy. What makes it difficult is the temptation of pleasure and other conventional goods
such as wealth, honor, rank, and so on. Confucius often praised his best disciple, Yan
Hui (颜回), for his steadfast adherence to the Way of virtue (ren 仁), in contrast to
other disciples who lacked unwavering commitment (Analects 6.7).
4. THE HIGHEST GOOD AND INCLUSIVE HAPPINESS
Scholars have made the distinction between two types of goods: one is called “the
desirable” or “non-moral goods,” the typical examples of which are pleasure, wealth,
rank, health, and longevity; the other is what some scholars refer to as “the admirable”
or “moral goods,” an example of which is virtue (Zagzebski 2006; Olberding 2013;
Back 2018). While ideally the good life is understood as consisting of both kinds of
goods, in reality one sometimes must make a choice when the two are in conflict.
Confucius remarked, “We all desire wealth and honor, but ill-gotten gains are not worth
having” (Analects 4.5). 6 When one had to choose between the desirable and the
admirable, the virtuous would always choose the admirable. Confucius proposed the
following principle to help his disciples make the right decision: “It is shameful to be
poor and lowly when the state is well-governed (ban-you-dao 邦有道); it is no less

5

Even in a contemporary democracy like the United States, you cannot bring the greatest amount of
happiness to the greatest number of people unless you run for office. Again, classical utilitarianism was
not designed as a moral compass for private individuals.
6
My translation.
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shameful to be rich and honorable when the state is ill-governed” (Analects 8.13).7 It
would not be hard to tell if a state was well-governed or ill-governed. If it was governed
according to the ritual (li 禮), it would be well-governed. If not, then it is ill-governed.8
Thus, it is not entirely up to the virtuous to lead a good life because it is contingent
upon the circumstances that are often beyond one’s control.9 It shows that moral virtue
is not sufficient for the good life. The virtuous therefore must prepare a contingency
plan just in case the Way does not prevail. 10 The good life is achievable when
circumstances afford the possibility of obtaining both the admirable and desirable
(Olberding 2013, 433). “[W]hat is at issue is not what sort of life, simpliciter, one might
want, but what sort of life it is best to seek and to have where conditions force the
admirable and the desirable apart” (434). When one must choose between the two types
of goods, the virtuous are those who can resist the temptation of the desirable (or nonmoral goods) and consistently opt for the ethical (moral goods).
Ideally, happiness consists in the commensurate relationship between the desirable
and the ethical. In other words, the virtuous should be rewarded with the desirable.
Youngsun Back refers to such a relationship as “moral economy” (Back 2018, 41). This
idea, however, is not new. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) calls the condition in which
happiness is commensurate with virtue “the highest good” (Kant 2002, 141-142). For
Kant, human beings cannot realize the highest good without the help of an all-powerful,
all-knowing, and all-good being, namely God. While the Kantian model of moral
community consists of equal, rational, and free individuals, the classical Confucian
model of community is communal in nature comprising a hierarchical structure of a
ruler governing the people through his ministers and officials of lower ranks. Classical
Confucian thinkers believed that in order for the virtuous individual to make the people
happy, they would need to participate in the government that followed the Way
(Analects 2.19). For the virtuous, true happiness was not an egotistical or self-centered
concept, but a communal one. Mencius referred to it as “inclusive (or shared)
happiness” (tong-le 同樂) (Mencius 1B1). Mencius (372-289 BCE) perhaps was the
first to propose the idea of “inclusive (or shared) happiness” (tong-le 同 樂 ). By
“inclusive happiness”, Mencius did not mean the happiness of one person shared with
another. What he meant was the enjoyment of a ruler shared with his people. Although
Mencius’ theoretical rival Mo Zi (479-381 BCE) was famous for his signature idea of
inclusive (or universal) love (jian-ai 兼愛), and we may draw the idea of inclusive
7

My translation. Both D.C. Lau and Raymond Dawson translate “邦有道” as “when the Way prevails.”
It makes the Way sound mysterious. But there is nothing mysterious about Confucius’ Way. It is not a
Platonic form, nor is it mystic metaphysical entity. By “the Way”, Confucius means the way a state
should be governed. It is either governed correctly or incorrectly. When it is governed correctly, that’s
what 邦有道 means. When it is governed incorrectly, that’s what 邦無道 means.
8
Confucius says, “A state should be governed according to the ritual” (Analects 11.26).
9
Classical Confucians put this idea in the following form: “Life and death is determined by fate; wealth
and honor is up to heaven” (生死有命, 富貴在天) (Analects 12.5. my translation).
10
Again, the "Way" is not some mysterious metaphysical entity. It refers to the virtuous rulership. For
Confucius, there were long historical periods in antiquity during which the Way prevailed, that is to say,
a sage ruler was at the helm. The exemplary sage rulers were Yao, Shun, Yu, Duke of Zhou, and so on.
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happiness from his theory, Mozi did not use the expression of tong-le (同樂). When
classical utilitarian thinkers in the Western tradition talked about happiness, they did
not mean the agent’s own happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness for the
greatest number of people, which can be understood as inclusive happiness. Thus, the
greatest happiness principle of classical utilitarianism is more of a guideline for
governments and international organizations such as the United Nations, than a moral
compass for the individual moral agent. If I help a stranger in need, the result of my
action is a far cry from the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of
people. Many people do not understand this and they try to use the greatest happiness
principle as their personal moral guidance, which is like shooting mosquitos with a
bazooka. In his conversation with the King of the state of Qi, Mencius exhorted him to
share his happiness with his people (ibid.). He argued that the king’s inclusive
happiness would help him win the respect and support of the people, which in turn
would make both his desirable (non-moral) and admirable (moral) goods secure.
Inclusive happiness is ethical happiness. In general, if a ruler shared his happiness with
his people, he would be morally virtuous. Thus, moral virtue is necessary for (inclusive)
happiness.
5. HUMAN NATURE
Another argument for virtue being necessary for happiness is what I call “the argument
from human nature.” According to this line of reasoning, attributed to the Cheng (程)
brothers of Neo-Confucian persuasion, one can achieve happiness (le 樂) from a variety
of sources—eating, drinking, sex, and so on, but these sources are what human beings
share with other species. What differentiates us from other species is morality.
Therefore, the unique joy we can obtain is from doing things related to morality such
as performing altruistic actions, making sacrifices for the common good, exercising
moral virtue, and so forth (Huang 2008, 342). Notice that this Neo-Confucian argument
has its origin in the famous classical Confucian idea that human nature is good,
proposed by Mencius (6A2). For Mencius, human beings have four innate tendencies
(si-duan 四端) that can develop into full-fledged virtues of benevolence, righteousness,
ritual propriety, and moral wisdom, if cultivated properly. Each of the four tendencies
is necessary for humanity (2A6). According to Mencius, the greatest happiness comes
from the self-realization upon reflection that one has moral integrity (cheng 誠 )
(Mencius 7A4). It may be argued that moral integrity is the totality of all four cardinal
virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and moral wisdom. If so, then
it seems to follow that for Mencius, moral virtues are not only individually necessary,
but also jointly sufficient for happiness. However, Mencius may have overstated his
case and overestimated the extent to which human beings are capable of taking great
delight in morality. In this regard, Confucius’ idea seems to be more plausible. He
stated that the virtuous would have no worries and fears if upon self-reflection they
could find themselves not guilty of immorality (Analects 12.4). This sense of (ethical)
happiness as freedom from negative psychological states such as fear, worry, anxiety,
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and so on, seems to be more defensible. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we
can summarize the classical Confucian idea of ethical happiness as follows: it is
obtained through ethical means; it is inclusive; it is free from negative psychological
states.
6. TEXTUAL EVIDENCE
In this section the main focus is on two most well-known and authoritative classical
Confucian texts—The Analects and The Mencius—to see how well they substantiate
the tenor of the Confucian view. As mentioned earlier, a salient feature of
Confucianism is the primacy of the ethical, but this does not mean that classical
Confucian philosopher would flatly reject the desirable such as wealth and pleasure
(Shun 2014, 131). They were, however, scrupulous about the way in which non-moral
goods are obtained. For example, Confucius taught his disciples to distance themselves
from pleasures obtained through immoral means (Analects 4.5). This can be seen as the
classical Confucian critique of hedonistic theory of happiness. I argue that for
Confucius and Mencius there are two kinds of happiness: ethical and unethical. “Ethical
happiness” is a term one rarely, if ever, finds in the literature of ethics and/or moral
philosophy. In everyday parlance, the expression “good, clean, wholesome, family fun”
is akin to “ethical happiness.” I said “akin” because they may be overlapping but not
identical. Pleasure obtained by watching porn or doing drugs does not belong in the
category of good, clean, wholesome, family fun.11 I think “ethical happiness” can
represent and integrate two classical Confucian ideas: (1) happiness obtained through
ethical means; (2) inclusive (or shared) happiness. Ethical happiness is obtained
through ethical means, whereas unethical happiness by unethical means. Ethical
happiness is inclusive (or shared) happiness, but unethical happiness is exclusive or
unshared. The same Confucian critique applies to desire satisfaction theory. In his
autobiographical sketch, Confucius claimed that at seventy he could freely follow his
desires without transgressing the bounds of morality (Analects 2.4). If happiness is
defined as desire satisfaction, then how does one go about satisfying one’s desires?
Again, there are two ways: ethical and unethical. As for objective list theory, classical
Confucian thinkers would ask the same question. Many items on an objective list tend
to be non-moral goods.12 If there is a choice to be made between the desirable (nonmoral goods) and the ethical (moral goods), the virtuous will consistently choose the
latter. Confucius remarked, “Wealth and rank are what people desire, but if one can’t
get them by means that accord with the Way, one will not accept them” (Analects 4.5).13
Mencius made essentially the same point when he said, “In ancient times men were
11

According to an article in the Atlantic, most people (in the United States) think that watching porn is
morally wrong. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/most-people-think-watchingpor
n-is-morally-wrong/284240/>
12
It is called “objective list” because items on the list are supposed to contribute to one’s wellbeing
objectively, that is, regardless of whether you want them or not. To illustrate, you may not like broccoli
but it is good for you.
13
Burton Watson’s translation (2007).
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indeed eager to take office, but they dislike seeking it by dishonorable means…”
(Mencius 3B3).14 Concerning the basic sources of happiness such as food and sex,
Mencius had this to say,
Suppose you would manage to get something to eat if you took the food from your elder
brother by twisting his arm, but would not get it if you did not. Would you twist his arm?
Again, suppose you would get a wife if you climbed over the wall of your neighbor on the
east side and dragged away the daughter of the house by force, but would not if you did
not. Would you drag her away by force? (Mencius 6B1).15

Of course, the questions Mencius posed in this passage were meant to be rhetorical.
Food and sex give one pleasures, but one should not obtain such pleasures by force or
other unethical means. Speaking of his best disciple Yan Hui, Confucius gushed,
What a fine man Hui was! One container of rice, one dipperful of drink, living in a back
alley—others couldn’t have endured the gloom of it, but he never let it affect his happiness.
What a fine man Hui was! (Analects 6.11)16

In this passage, Confucius did not simply use “happiness” (le 樂) as a descriptive term;
he was saying that Yan Hui’s happiness was morally praiseworthy because Yan
remained cheerful and optimistic in spite of the adversity and hardship he
experienced.17 Confucius’ approbation of Yan, however, should not be construed as
evidence that classical Confucians would endorse asceticism—deliberately shunning
the desirable (non-moral goods) even when their attainment would not deviate from the
Way. Yan was indeed cheerful and virtuous, but did he lead a good life?
While happiness is “a special feeling that comes to those who follow the Way,” the
good life is a broader concept that consist of more than a feeling. According to
Haybron, the good life consists of wellbeing, morality/virtue, and other values, and
wellbeing in turn is inclusive of psychological states such as happiness, and other goods
like health, success, friendship, and so on (2008, 38). It is true that Yan Hui was
cheerful and virtuous, but he was poor and unhealthy. Thus, we cannot say that he led
a good life. Youngsun Back argues that in spite of his effusive praise of Yan, Confucius
would probably insist on moral virtue only as a necessary condition for the good life.
Back compares the life of Emperor Shun (舜) with that of Yan Hui and points out that
while both Emperor Shun and Yan were renowned for their virtues, there is a striking
contrast between their lives: Shun became a sovereign and enjoyed longevity, whereas
Yan lived in poverty and died prematurely. Thus, Confucius would say that Shun had
lived a better life (Back 2018, 39). Shun’s life contained both moral goods and nonmoral goods such as virtue, wealth, honor, political power, and longevity, while Yan’s
life contained virtue and happiness, but also poverty, illness, and untimely death.
14

Lau’s translation (1970).
Ibid.
16
Burton Watson’s translation.
17
Yan did not resort to unethical means to extricate himself from his poverty and hardship.
15
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Emperor Shun’s life was both admirable and desirable as his virtue was richly and
deservedly rewarded, whereas Yan Hui’s virtue was not. To an unbiased observer,
Yan’s life left something to be desired. If happiness means desire satisfaction, what
was lacking in Yan’s life was the desirable (or non-moral) goods. Moral virtue is
necessary for happiness, and happiness is necessary for the good life. Therefore, moral
virtue is necessary for the good life.
As mentioned earlier, ethical happiness is either obtained by ethical means or
shared (inclusive). No other passage in the Mencius shed a better light on the
relationship between moral virtue and (inclusive) happiness than 1A2. Mencius went
to see King Hui of Liang (梁惠王). Standing over a pond, the king asked Mencius if
the virtuous could enjoy looking at the large geese, deer, and the enchanting scenery.
It seems that the king assumed that the virtuous would be too high-minded and uptight
to enjoy the simple pleasures of the senses. To his surprise, however, Mencius replied
that only the virtuous could really enjoy such pleasures. Mencius explained, “It was by
sharing their enjoyments [tong-le 同樂 ] with the people that men of antiquity were
able to enjoy themselves” (ibid.).18 Clearly, passage 1A2 shows that first, there are two
kinds of happiness—shared (or inclusive) happiness and unshared (or exclusive)
happiness; anyone can enjoy unshared pleasures, but only the virtuous can truly enjoy
shared pleasures, not just with one’s family members or friends, but with the people in
general, and the capacity to enjoy inclusive happiness is what distinguishes the virtuous
from the rest;19 second, (having) moral virtue is a prerequisite for inclusive happiness,
which unites the self and non-self. If rulers were not virtuous, even though they owned
aesthetically exquisite gardens and lakes, they would not be able to enjoy them. But
why not? It seems that by looking at a beautiful scenery or frolicking animals almost
anyone can be happy in the psychological sense. However, it is not the case that you
can always enjoy yourself unconditionally—you need to be in a suitable frame of mind
to be happy.20
The most important of the conditions that contribute to the frame of mind conducive
to happiness is a harmonious social relationship. In the case of King Hui of Liang, in
order for him to enjoy himself, it would require at the very least that his people not
harbor animosity toward him. How could a ruler be happy if he knew that the multitude
resented his regime and wanted to dethrone him? A good case in point is King Jie (桀
1728-1675 BCE) whose rule was allegedly cruel and oppressive, and as a result, his
18

Lau’s translation (1970).
In the philosophy of mind, qualia are said to be subjective and private. If they are private, they cannot
be shared. Then how can there be shared pleasure or inclusive happiness? By “shared pleasure”, Mencius
does not mean that one person can directly share her pleasure with another like sharing a meal. What he
means by “shared pleasure” is this: I am happy that you are happy. That you are happy is the reason that
I am happy. Of course I cannot literally feel how you feel, but I can be happy because you are happy. In
the case of rulers, if they cared about the welfare of the people, the latter would reciprocate. They would
be happy if their rulers enjoyed themselves. If they treated their people unkindly, they would resent their
rulers’ happiness.
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Suppose you owe a large amount of money and your creditors are constantly harassing you. Would
you able to enjoy the sight of a beautiful sunset?
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people detested him so much they wished him dead. Clearly, he did not share his
happiness with his people; his was exclusive happiness, which he obtained by
exploiting his people. Mencius asked, “Even if the tyrant had terrace and pond, birds
and beasts, could he have enjoyed them all by himself?” (Mencius 1A2).21 His question
of course was rhetorical. If a ruler wanted to be happy, he would need to make his
people content. If he could make them happy, people from other states would flock to
him and live under his rule. As a result, his state would become more populous,
prosperous, and powerful. Needless to say, only a virtuous ruler could make his people
happy. As H.G. Creel puts it, “[The common people] can be made happy only by a
government that is good by their own standards” (Creel 1949, 156). Confucius made
the same point when the Duke of She consulted him about government: “If you could
make the people of your own state happy, those in faraway states would come”
(Analects 13.16).22
So far the passages from the Analects and the Mencius in support of the classical
Confucian perspective on the relationship between moral virtue and happiness have an
overt political context. Are there any passages in classical Confucian texts that make a
similar point in an apolitical context? The answer is yes. Besides the passage in the
Analects, where Confucius praised his best disciple Yan Hui for his optimism in
adversity, 7A20 in the Mencius is an apolitical passage where Mencius famously
declared that a virtuous person would delight in three things none of which had
anything to do with political power.
His parents are alive and his brothers are well. This is the first delight. Above, he is not
ashamed to face Heaven; below, he is not ashamed to face man. This is the second delight.
He has the good fortune of having the most talented pupils in the Empire. This is
the third delight (Mencius 7A20).23

While some parts of this quotation seem outdated to contemporary sensibility,
Mencius’ basic idea is not, because his point is that happiness is not a self-centered
mental state involving only one’s own pleasure. As mentioned earlier, the classical
Confucian conception of happiness is that it is inclusive or shared: I am joyous because
my family members are well; I am happy because I have not intentionally harmed
anyone; I am delighted because my students are brilliant. We cannot literally share
qualia of happiness with others. That is not what it is meant by “inclusive happiness”.
Inclusive happiness means that x’s happiness is the source of y’s happiness and vice
versa. Apply this to the relationship between a ruler and his people: If the people rejoice
in their ruler’s happiness, then the ruler’s happiness is inclusive. On the other hand, if
the people resent their ruler’s happiness and rejoice in their ruler’s unhappiness, it is an
indication that the ruler’s happiness is exclusive; he is not a virtuous leader because he
does not care about his people’s welfare.
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Translated by D.C. Lau (1970).
My translation.
23
Lau’s translation (1970).
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7. TWO SENSES OF HAPPINESS: PSYCHOLOGICAL VS. ETHICAL
Confucius famously condemned the head of the Ji family for having eight rows of
dancers performing in his courtyard: “If this can be tolerated, what cannot be
tolerated?” (Analects 3.1). According to the Rituals of Zhou (Zhou-li 周禮), only the
Emperor or Son of Heaven was entitled to the dance performed by eight rows of eight
dancers.24 While the head of the Ji family ranked far lower than the Emperor, he craved
the same grandiosity and fanfare, and indulged in fantasies of being the supreme ruler
of the land. According to Confucius, his enjoyment was reprehensible not merely
because it was not grounded in reality, but more importantly, he was taking something
that was not rightfully his. Confucius was not saying that the head of the Ji family was
not happy in the descriptive or psychological sense while watching the dance; he was
saying that the means by which he obtained his happiness was wrong. The virtuous
would be scrupulous in choosing their means to happiness.
In the normative sense, there are two kinds of happiness: one is ethical in that it is
gained within the bounds of morality; the other is unethical because it is obtained by
contravening the moral prescriptions. Of course there are cases where happiness falls
outside the domain of morality. Thus, the classical Confucian perspective on the
relationship between moral virtue and happiness may be stated as follows: the virtuous
would only pursue and enjoy the ethical (inclusive) kind of happiness and shun the
unethical kind. If you pursue and enjoy only ethical (inclusive) happiness, then you are
morally virtuous.
When scholars debate about whether or how moral virtue is related to happiness,
the two senses of happiness are not always clearly distinguished. For example, when
some say that virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness, they seem to use
the term “happiness” in the psychological sense. If someone who embezzles a large
sum of money goes to the Bahamas to soak up the sun on the beach, is he happy? In
the psychological sense, he is. While his happiness is obtained through unethical
means, there is no denying that he is nevertheless happy. It is this kind of cases that
some scholars have in mind when they assert that moral virtue is neither necessary nor
sufficient for happiness (in the psychological sense).
However, when a distinction is made, as done by classical Confucians, between the
ethical kind of happiness, i.e., happiness gained through moral means, and the
psychological kind, then the loophole between moral virtue and happiness seems to
disappear. Can a fraudster be happy in the ethical sense? Confucians would say no.
How could a person be happy if he reflected on his behavior and felt guilty about it?
Furthermore, a virtuous person would not commit fraud in the first place. On the other
hand, a morally depraved person would not feel guilty about his wrong doings. The
negative emotion he might experience would not be guilt, remorse, or shame, but fear
24

One might say that this sort of musty feudal ritual is archaic and outdated. I would like to remind the
reader that even in a modern democracy like the United States in which egalitarianism is highly valued,
old, inegalitarian, ritualistic tradition is still very much preserved. For example, a 21-gun salute is
reserved only for current and former presidents, president-elect, the head of state of a foreign country
and so on.
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of getting caught. Of course such fear would diminish his enjoyment. A word of caveat
is in order here. Sometimes even an immoral person uses ethical means to gain
happiness. For example, he may hold a job and use the money he has honestly earned
to buy ice cream to get pleasure. But he also spreads malicious rumors about a colleague
and cheats on his taxes. Just because he buys ice cream with his own money does not
necessarily mean he is morally virtuous. Moral self-cultivation is a long-term,
purposeful enterprise and cannot be achieved haphazardly or by luck. Just because you
are ethically happy does not necessarily mean you are virtuous. But if you are
consistently happy in the ethical sense, then you are morally virtuous. It is in this latter
sense that ethical happiness implies virtue. On the other hand, even an immoralist may
occasionally use moral means, but that does not detract from his fundamentally
immoral character. Moral virtue does not even guarantee ethical happiness precisely
because under some circumstances the virtuous would choose a course of action of selfsacrifice (unhappiness). Confucius said, “When the state follows the Way, being poor
and lowly is a cause for shame. When the state is without the Way, being rich and
eminent is a cause for shame.” (Analects 8.13).25 When the Way prevails, the virtuous
should strive for eminence, wealth, and honor. Possessing moral virtue in and of itself
is not enough for happiness, not even the ethical kind because the virtuous need the
cooperation of the social environment in which they find themselves. Sometimes, being
virtuous may result in unhappiness, as shown by an example given by Richard Kraut.
He argues that under certain circumstances, an honest person may suffer greatly
because of his honesty. He gives the imaginary example of an honest person who
discovers that the farm owned by his family has been obtained fraudulently. His
honesty leads him to divulge his family’s dirty secret. As a result, he suffers a
devastating financial loss (Kraut 2007, 192). What may be concluded from the above
discussion is that moral virtue is not sufficient for happiness; it may even result in great
unhappiness on the part of its possessor.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have seen that happiness is a concept with multifarious meanings and senses from
which much of the confusion and controversy arises. There are two senses in which
Western philosophers and psychologists use the term “happiness”: a descriptive sense
and a prescriptive sense. With regard to the nature of happiness, there are three
representative theories: hedonism, which identifies happiness with pleasure; desire
satisfaction theory, which defines happiness in terms of desire fulfillment; and
objective list theory, which views happiness as being constituted by a number of
important goods. Recent literature on classical Confucianism vis-à-vis the subject of
happiness suggests that the classical Confucian notions of happiness and good life do
not fit neatly into the aforementioned Western conceptual framework, mainly because
they have an integral ethical dimension. Scholars agree that for Confucius and Mencius
there are two types of goods: the admirable such as moral virtue and the Way, and the
25
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desirable (nonmoral) goods like wealth, rank, pleasure, health, life, and so on. Moral
virtue, or the lack thereof, is understood in terms of how these two types of goods are
prioritized in one’s attitudes, choices, and actions. The classical Confucian texts I have
examined and cited, namely the Analects and the Mencius, largely support their
interpretations. My contribution to this discussion is the following: I proposed the idea
of inclusive (or ethical) happiness which I have argued can better represent the classical
Confucian understanding of the concept. The Confucian idea of inclusive happiness
may be summarized as having two senses: (1) it is happiness obtained through ethical
means; (2) it is inclusive (or shared). If one consistently obtains happiness through
ethical means or consistently enjoy inclusive happiness, then one is morally virtuous.
Clearly, moral virtue is required for inclusive happiness. Its opposite, of course, is
exclusive or unshared happiness. A criminal, for example, is someone who pursues
exclusive happiness, i.e., happiness at the expense of others. A rapist who killed his
victim personifies the idea of exclusive happiness. In the Confucian tradition, King Jie
and King Zhou are considered the quintessential evil rulers. But what defines such
villainous tyrants? A defining characteristic of them is their pursuit of exclusive
happiness. Another defining characteristic of villainy is the tendency to spread one’s
pain to others. The virtuous are those who consistently rather than haphazardly follow
the Way and prefer inclusive happiness to exclusive happiness. Consequently, I
conclude that that the classical Confucian perspective on the relationship between
moral virtue and (inclusive) happiness is that the former is necessary, rather than
sufficient, for the latter.
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